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THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION 
FOREWORD 
David S. Schwartz,* Jonathan Gienapp,** John Mikhail*** & Richard 
Primus**** 
 
Over the past twenty years, constitutional law has taken a decidedly 
historical turn, both in academia and in the courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decisions are increasingly filled with extended historical 
inquiries, and not just by self-described originalists.1  Yet much of this 
historical inquiry is severely distorted.  Twenty-first-century lawyers and 
judges enjoy improved and ever-widening access to a rich array of primary 
sources from the founding era and the early republic, but the ability of 
modern interpreters to make sense of these materials is pervasively affected 
by present biases.  Many of these biases stem directly from long-standing 
received narratives of constitutional meaning.  Every generation of 
constitutional interpreters since 1787 has indulged to some extent in the 
American penchant for linking present-day intuitions to the minds of the 
founders.2  This does not necessarily make us “all originalists now,”3 but it 
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 1. Compare, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573–636 (Scalia, J.) 
(examining the original historical understanding of the Second Amendment), with id. at 636–
80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).  
 2. See Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1703 
(2012) (“Attention to original intentions and expectations facilitates judges’ guardianship of 
long-term values, helps to constitute us as a people with temporally extended commitments, 
and lends the Framers’ credibility to the results reached through an otherwise legitimacy-
challenged system of judge-made constitutional law.”); Richard Primus, Why Enumeration 
Matters, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13, 20 (2016) (certain constitutional interpretations are 
“continuity tenders” that ritually “affirm a connection to one’s predecessors”). 
 3. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A 
DEBATE 1 (2011) (“We are all originalists now.”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Solicitor General Elena Kagan) (“[W]e 
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does tend to make every generation’s interpretive narrative—whether from 
James Madison in 1830,4 Roger Taney in 1857,5 Robert Jackson in 1942,6 or 
Clarence Thomas in our own day7—into an origin myth. 
A challenge for historical understanding of the founding is that the 
dominant origin myth has been shaped so deeply by political developments 
more than a decade following ratification of the Constitution.  The electoral 
dominance of the Jeffersonian-Republican and Jacksonian-Democratic 
political parties between 1800 and 1860 rewrote the founding narrative in 
ways that even today remain to be disentangled.  For the century following 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s death in 1835, the Supreme Court would be 
dominated by Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Justices or by Justices whose 
constitutional worldview was shaped in no small measure by Jeffersonian-
Jacksonian jurisprudence.  Even today, it is difficult to avoid reading 
founding-era evidence through that distorting prism.  As a result, ideas like 
“dual sovereignty” and “limited enumerated powers” that were contested in 
the founding era and only “settled” by post-1800 constitutional politics are 
mistaken for the Constitution’s consensus “original meaning.”  The 
ideologies of once powerful cohorts can become unfamiliar or even lost after 
the landscape of power shifts.  This was largely true of the Federalists. 
We come to unbury the Federalists, not to praise them.  Not that they are 
unworthy of praise:  many ideas promoted by the founding-era Federalists 
were sensible, intelligent, or even wise.  They also had shortcomings.  Our 
present aim, however, is neither to censure the Federalists nor to argue that 
they were superior to the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians who followed them.  
Instead, our intention in gathering a distinguished group of constitutional 
historians is to make progress in excavating the lost civilization of the 
Federalists, whose constitutional ideology predominated before 1800 but 
faded thereafter.  This Symposium does not claim to initiate this historical 
inquiry.  But by giving a name to the constellation of ideas and practices we 
study—“the Federalist Constitution”—we hope to encourage increased 
interest and coherence in the enterprise of presenting a historically accurate 
picture of the founding. 
The essays that follow do not purport to show that the original meaning of 
the Constitution cleanly reflected a Federalist agenda.  Rather, they 
 
apply what [the Framers] say, what they meant to do.  So in that sense, we are all 
originalists.”). 
 4. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS 
OF JAMES MADISON 411, 417 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (emphasizing fundamental continuities 
between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution). 
 5. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422–23 (1857) (inferring the original 
proslavery intent of the Framers based on later antebellum demands of slave states), 
superseded by constiutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 6. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (“At the beginning Chief Justice 
Marshall described the Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded.”). 
 7. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life . . . would remain outside the reach of the 
Federal Government.”). 
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demonstrate that the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the ratification 
debates, and the precedents of the early republic together produced a 
Constitution that combined Federalist with Anti-Federalist elements and left 
considerable room for further contestation.  One simply cannot make sense 
of the original Constitution without reckoning with the Federalist ideas that 
originally surrounded it.  The present-day significance of this historical 
inquiry is to highlight problems with thinking that the Constitution’s 
contested provisions had singular “original meanings” and to reinforce the 
proposition that a political settlement of constitutional meaning reached 
decades after ratification cannot “fix” original meaning retroactively.8  
Indeed, the story that emerges strongly suggests that the range of 
constitutional meanings available in one generation can be altered by a later 
one—both as a descriptive and a normative matter. 
What do we mean by “the Federalist Constitution”?  Roughly, we mean a 
vision of the Constitution held between 1787 and 1800 by leading figures in 
the struggle for constitutional ratification and, thereafter, by leading figures 
in the Federalist Party—a group that dominated the Constitution’s formative 
years.  Needless to say, those individuals did not agree on all points all the 
time, and we accordingly do not suggest that the Federalist Constitution, as 
we use the term, was a comprehensive theory or a crisply formulated dogma.  
Instead, we conceive of the Federalist Constitution as a cluster concept with 
many features, most or all of which were embraced by many leading 
Federalists.9  Those features include but are not limited to: 
 an operative preamble, signifying more than mere throat clearing; 
 broad legislative power to address all national problems; 
 complete and inherent foreign affairs powers; 
 exclusive national direction of relations with Indian tribes; 
 an implied power to regulate the domestic interstate slave trade and 
possibly even to abolish slavery throughout the United States; 
 other inherent and implied national and corporate powers, together with 
sweeping legislative authority to carry them into execution; 
 prohibition of both criminal and civil ex post facto laws; 
 state suability and broad equitable powers of the federal courts; 
 federal common law, including a federal common law of crimes; and 
 above all, the recognition that the United States was a nation and 
therefore, that the government of the United States was a genuine 
national government possessing the inherent powers of national 
governments, including the powers to provide for the common defense, 
 
 8. See generally JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION:  FIXING THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). 
 9. That some of these features were disavowed by some leading Federalists during the 
ratification debates or opposed by some leading Federalists (or former Federalists) during 
postratification politics does not mean that those features were not affirmatively embraced by 
many or most Federalists at the relevant times. 
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promote the general welfare, and fulfill all of the other ends for which 
that government was formed. 
*** 
The essays that follow fall roughly into three topical groups.  One set deals 
with the interpretive implications of excavating the Federalist Constitution.  
Jonathan Gienapp leads off the Symposium with “In Search of Nationhood 
at the Founding.”10  Gienapp argues that anachronistic analysis of founding-
era social contract thinking has unduly emphasized a conflictual relationship 
between government and liberty and thus missed the ways in which 
Federalists harnessed social contract theory to justify expansive 
governmental authority.11  They did so by identifying the United States as a 
genuine nation, representing a national compact of individuals, and whose 
government, accordingly, was equipped with the broad power to act on behalf 
of this national people.  Richard Primus, in “Reframing Article I, Section 8,” 
develops a significant interpretive consequence of that Federalist approach 
to nationhood.12  Primus argues that the Constitution’s enumeration of 
congressional powers is best understood as a “means of empowerment, rather 
than limitation,” once we perceive the problems with the conventional 
narratives of “limited enumerated powers”—particularly that a limiting 
enumeration was not well matched to the kinds of limits the Framers wanted 
to impose on a national government.13 
The next pair of essays shows room for divergence within the broad 
agreement over the Federalist Constitution framework—in this case, 
different views of James Madison’s contribution to the Federalist 
Constitution. In “President Madison’s Living Constitution:  Fixation, 
Liquidation, and Constitutional Politics in the Jeffersonian Era,” Saul Cornell 
argues that, contrary to originalists who have claimed Madison as their own, 
modern originalism, particularly public meaning originalism, is far closer in 
spirit to the Anti-Federalist and “Old Republican” critics who challenged 
Madison.14  Rather than embrace a strongly textualist approach to 
constitutional interpretation centered on modern originalist ideas of fixation 
and constraint, Madison sought a more holistic approach to constitutional 
interpretation, one that acknowledged the centrality of constitutional 
politics.15  David S. Schwartz and John Mikhail, in “The Other Madison 
Problem,” question the assumed primacy of Madison’s thought in the 
framing of the Constitution.16  They argue that Madison was neither the 
 
 10. Jonathan Gienapp, In Search of Nationhood at the Founding, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1783 (2021). 
 11. Id. at 1789. 
 12. Richard Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2003 (2021). 
 13. Id. at 2005. 
 14. Saul Cornell, President Madison’s Living Constitution:  Fixation, Liquidation, and 
Constitutional Politics in the Jeffersonian Era, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761 (2021). 
 15. Id. at 1778. 
 16. David S. Schwartz & John Mikhail, The Other Madison Problem, 89 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2033 (2021). 
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“father of the Constitution” nor its leading theorist, as his proposals at the 
Philadelphia Convention were aimed at controlling state governments rather 
than on empowering the national government to regulate the people 
directly.17 
The second set of essays develops the idea that understanding the founding 
requires attention to the place of the newly formed United States in the 
Atlantic and greater North American world, ringed by Native nations and the 
ongoing colonial incursions of European powers.  So viewed, the new 
Constitution created what some scholars refer to as a “fiscal-military state” 
and which leading Americans preferred to style the “empire for liberty,” with 
aspirations to expand across the continent at the expense of these other 
nations.  In “The Federalist Constitution as a Project in International Law,” 
David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch bridge this theme with the first group 
of essays.  They identify three dimensions of the law of nations that the 
founders used to pursue their constitutional project:  the first dimension was 
the law of nations’ strictly international aspects, akin to modern public 
international law; the second was its rich body of resources, featured in a 
robust transnational dialogue, that was supposed to guide the design and 
governance of a “civilized” federal state, akin to modern comparative 
constitutional law; and the third was its transnational dimension as a body of 
natural law principles and common usages that helped coordinate cross-
border relations among the states and their citizens, as well as between them 
and foreigners.  According to Golove and Hulsebosch, it is impossible to 
understand the Constitution without an appreciation of these still unfamiliar 
premises of the founding generation’s state-building project.18  Gregory 
Ablavsky likewise connects the themes of these first two sets of essays in 
“Two Federalist Constitutions of Empire.”19  Focusing on the new republic’s 
efforts to mediate between U.S. citizens and Native peoples, Ablavsky 
explores the tension between the Federalist “constitution of constraint” that 
used federal power to discipline an unruly, expansionist citizenry and the 
equally Federalist “constitution of empowerment” that directed national 
power outward.20  In the end, he suggests, empowerment prevailed largely 
because Federalists failed to anticipate how adept the nation’s citizens would 
be at exploiting federal power for their own purposes.21  Mary Bilder, in 
“Without Doors:  Native Nations and the Convention,” brings to light a 
virtually forgotten narrative of Native nations’ presence and diplomatic 
efforts in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to confirm treaty obligations 
 
 17. Id. at 2036–37. 
 18. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Federalist Constitution as a Project 
of International Law, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1841 (2021). 
 19. Gregory Ablavsky, Two Federalist Constitutions of Empire, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1677 (2021). 
 20. Id. at 1678. 
 21. Id. at 1700. 
1674 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
in the new Constitution and bar state claims of authority.22  Bilder argues that 
these efforts were largely, if temporarily, successful despite the misleading 
absence of express language in the Constitution’s text and that the framing 
generation “without doors” also participated in creating the Constitution. 23 
In “Slavery’s Constitution:  Rethinking the Federal Consensus,” Maeve 
Glass sheds new light on the so-called “federal consensus,” in which implied 
powers under the new Constitution were seemingly required to be interpreted 
not to extend to slavery.  Glass argues that this doctrine was an extension of 
a preconstitutional doctrine of “noninterference” with mutually profitable 
commercial relationships between Southern slaveowning planters and 
merchants and their Northern correspondents and business partners.24  Yet as 
James E. Pfander and Elena Joffroy argue in “Equal Footing and the States 
‘Now Existing’: Slavery and State Equality over Time,” antislavery 
Federalists had successfully “secured constitutional provisions that 
empowered Congress to foreclose much interstate and foreign traffic in 
enslaved persons to confine slavery to the states ‘now existing.’”25  This 
original intention would be overruled in subsequent years by the political 
triumph of the “federal consensus.”26  In an essay on a closely related theme, 
“The Unwritten Constitution for Admitting States,” Roderick M. Hills Jr. 
argues that the original Federalist constitutional template for admitting new 
states under Article IV, Section 3 gave Congress broad power to govern new 
territory as colonies of the original states, in the hope of controlling unruly 
settlers.27  Eventually, however, this original understanding was supplanted 
by a popular sovereignty theory of admitting new states on an “equal 
footing,” offering a demonstration that durable constitutional rules are 
grounded in “cross-partisan constitutional conventions,” rather than text or 
original meaning.28 
The third set of essays explores the themes of the Federalist Constitution 
in Articles II and III.  In “Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the 
Marshall Court:  A Rereading of Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy,” Jane Manners argues that scholars have anachronistically 
misread the Federalist balance of war power between the executive and 
Congress.29  Reexamining two important 1804 Marshall Court precedents, 
 
 22. Mary Sarah Bilder, Without Doors:  Native Nations and the Convention, 89 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1707 (2021). 
 23. Id. at 1709–10. 
 24. Maeve Glass, Slavery’s Constitution:  Rethinking the Federal Consensus, 89 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1815 (2021). 
 25. James E. Pfander & Elena Joffroy, Equal Footing and the States “Now Existing”: 
Slavery and State Equality over Time, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2021). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Unwritten Constitution for Admitting States, 89 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1877 (2021). 
 28. Id. at 1877. 
 29. Jane Manners, Executive Power and the Rule of Law in the Marshall Court:  A 
Rereading of Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 89 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1941 (2021). 
2021] FOREWORD:  THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION 1675 
Manners recovers the forgotten understanding that the president could 
neither advance the nation closer to war than Congress intended nor give 
officers a right to act where Congress had not.30  Thomas H. Lee, in “Article 
IX, Article III, and the First Congress:  The Original Constitutional Plan for 
the Federal Courts, 1787–1792,” argues that new federal judiciary’s key 
mission was to mitigate favoritism for domestic litigants in order to 
incentivize international trade and investment.31  This little known purpose, 
Lee suggests, sheds new light on several disputed elements of federal judicial 
power.32  Finally, in “Presidential Removal:  The Marbury Problem and the 
Madison Solutions,” Jed Handelsman Shugerman unpacks the mistaken 
assumptions built into the belief that the Article II’s Vesting Clause mandates 
the theory of a unitary executive, recently endorsed by the Supreme Court.33  
Shugerman argues that faulty assumptions about the meaning of the Vesting 
Clause represent a semantic and constitutional “drift” that is belied by 
founding-era understandings.34 
*** 
We hope that readers will find that these essays shed new light on enduring 




 30. Id. at 1948–49. 
 31. Thomas H. Lee, Article IX, Article III, and the First Congress:  The Original 
Constitutional Plan for the Federal Courts, 1787–1792, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1895 (2021). 
 32. Id. at 1933–40. 
 33. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Presidential Removal:  The Marbury Problem and the 
Madison Solutions, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2085 (2021). 
 34. Id. at 2111. 
